Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #BondMarket
Most recents (13)
Did someone warn you of the current #inflation, #recession, and #bearmarket in equities? Did you get out or reallocate in time? Breaking even? Maybe even profit?
Did you pay a subscription for those warnings late last year?
I started warning friends about it in 2016.
Read on🧵
Did you pay a subscription for those warnings late last year?
I started warning friends about it in 2016.
Read on🧵
When I said that I was warning my friends about it in 2016, I did so because it was clear that #Trump would not be a good president for the US & world #economy long-term, and would increase the odds of #inflation and rising #interestrates.
Late 2016 DMs in Norwegian to a friend:
Late 2016 DMs in Norwegian to a friend:
Daily Bookmarks to GAVNet 11/12/2021 greeneracresvaluenetwork.wordpress.com/2021/11/12/dai…
The Real Tantrum Should Be Over The Disturbing Lack of Celebration (higher yields)
alhambrapartners.com/2021/11/02/the…
#yield #BondMarket #CentralBank #normalization #InterestRates
alhambrapartners.com/2021/11/02/the…
#yield #BondMarket #CentralBank #normalization #InterestRates
Identification of LZTFL1 as a candidate effector gene at a COVID-19 risk locus
nature.com/articles/s4158…
#SARSCoV2 #genetics #risk #RespiratoryFailure #GainOfFunction #variants #TherapeuticTargets
nature.com/articles/s4158…
#SARSCoV2 #genetics #risk #RespiratoryFailure #GainOfFunction #variants #TherapeuticTargets
Daily Bookmarks to GAVNet 04/15/2021 greeneracresvaluenetwork.wordpress.com/2021/04/15/dai…
Mathematician Disproves 80-Year-Old Algebra Conjecture
quantamagazine.org/mathematician-…
#algebra #mathematicians #proofs
quantamagazine.org/mathematician-…
#algebra #mathematicians #proofs
Modern Monetary Theory For Conservatives
theamericanconservative.com/articles/moder…
#ModernMonetaryTheory #conservatism #FederalFunding #EconomicPolicies
theamericanconservative.com/articles/moder…
#ModernMonetaryTheory #conservatism #FederalFunding #EconomicPolicies
Daily Bookmarks to GAVNet 04/03/2021 greeneracresvaluenetwork.wordpress.com/2021/04/03/dai…
Researchers develop 'explainable' artificial intelligence algorithm
techxplore.com/news/2021-04-a…
#algorithms #ArtificialIntelligence
techxplore.com/news/2021-04-a…
#algorithms #ArtificialIntelligence
Road Salt Is Imperiling Aquatic Ecosystems. It Doesn’t Have To.
undark.org/2021/03/11/roa…
#AquaticEcosystems #RoadSalt
undark.org/2021/03/11/roa…
#AquaticEcosystems #RoadSalt
After the buildup and the crash-course in my last post, here is my post analysing Promoter Financing market in India. The analysis attempts to explain the slowdown in promoter financing in India and brings out some interesting facts. Read on to know more. Thread 1/12
As per BSE data, the aggregate value of promoters' pledged shares was ~1.85 lakh crore as at Aug 23, 2019. In comparison, the value of promoters' pledged shares stood at ~Rs 2.5 lakh crore as at Aug 30, 2018. The fall in pledge levels indicate slowdown in promoter financing. 2/12
An ET article (July 22), observed that 'pledging of shares by promoters of NSE companies dropped to a six-year low'. Another ET article (Aug 15), noted that 'interest rates on loans against shares (LAS) have surged by about 300 basis points in the past 3 months'. 3/12
8 questions to ask before you invest in a Credit Fund.
Q1) How much yield should the fund offer?
A) The principle of 'higher-the-better' does not apply to credit funds. Higher yields come with disproportionately higher risks. Funds offering 11%+ are a clear avoid. Thread 1/8
Q1) How much yield should the fund offer?
A) The principle of 'higher-the-better' does not apply to credit funds. Higher yields come with disproportionately higher risks. Funds offering 11%+ are a clear avoid. Thread 1/8
Q2) How diversified is the fund?
A) A fund with higher diversification is less risky. As per regulations, exposure in a company cannot exceed 10%. Well managed funds cap exposure in one company to 5% or lower. Lower exposure means lower hit on return if an accident happens. 2/8
A) A fund with higher diversification is less risky. As per regulations, exposure in a company cannot exceed 10%. Well managed funds cap exposure in one company to 5% or lower. Lower exposure means lower hit on return if an accident happens. 2/8
Q3) Does the fund have high exit loads?
A) Usually exit loads ensure that investors allow fund managers time to execute strategies. However, very high exit loads often result in debt-traps restricting investors' exit even when there are glaring mistakes made by fund-managers. 3/8
A) Usually exit loads ensure that investors allow fund managers time to execute strategies. However, very high exit loads often result in debt-traps restricting investors' exit even when there are glaring mistakes made by fund-managers. 3/8
Today I cover the Government Securities (G-Secs) market. G-Secs, in short, are debt instruments through which Government borrows from the public (banks, financial institutions etc.). This post covers the size, type of lenders, and other broad contours of G-Sec market. Thread 1/8
The total size of the G-Sec market is approx. 92.86 lakh crore. In comparison, the size of the listed equity market (total market capitalisation of all listed stocks) was 141.47 lakh crore in July, 2019. (2/8)
Out of the total borrowing of Rs. 92.86 lakh crore, ~ Rs. 64.49 lakh crore borrowing is from Central Govt and the remaining Rs. 28.37 lakh crore borrowing is from State Govts i.e. of the the total borrowings 69.45 % is from Central Govt and 30.55 % is from State Govts. (3/8)
Government, on August 13, issued a 'Scheme to provide a one-time partial credit guarantee to PSBs for purchase of pooled assets of financially sound NBFCs'. This scheme is a step in right direction towards solving the liquidity crunch that NBFCs are faced with. Thread (1/12)
It may be recalled that the Finance Minister, in her budget speech, had made an announcement to this effect. Thid scheme attempts to address temporary asset liability mismatches of NBFCs/HFCs so that they don't have to resort to distress sale owing to paucity of liquidity. 2/12
The major features of this scheme are:
A) It is a one time guarantee provided by GoI, for a period of 24 months.
B) The schemes is only applicable to PSU banks for first loss of up to 10%
C) Guarantee can be invoked if the credit rating of the pool goes to 'D' (default). 3/12
A) It is a one time guarantee provided by GoI, for a period of 24 months.
B) The schemes is only applicable to PSU banks for first loss of up to 10%
C) Guarantee can be invoked if the credit rating of the pool goes to 'D' (default). 3/12
The Yes Bank scare for Mutual Funds (MFs)
Some MFs have significant exposure to subordinated/ perpetual bonds of Yes Bank. These MFs stare at huge valuation losses if the credit rating of these bonds is cut below investment grade. Thread (1/9)
Some MFs have significant exposure to subordinated/ perpetual bonds of Yes Bank. These MFs stare at huge valuation losses if the credit rating of these bonds is cut below investment grade. Thread (1/9)
The following MFs have major exposure to Basel II/ Basel III, subordinated/ perpetual bonds of Yes Bank (market value as at 31st July, 2019) -
a) Reliance Nippon ~ Rs. 2150 Cr.
b) Franklin Templeton ~ Rs. 540 Cr.
c) UTI ~ Rs. 445 Cr.
d) Kotak ~ Rs.115 Cr.
2/9
a) Reliance Nippon ~ Rs. 2150 Cr.
b) Franklin Templeton ~ Rs. 540 Cr.
c) UTI ~ Rs. 445 Cr.
d) Kotak ~ Rs.115 Cr.
2/9
The Credit Rating of Yes Bank Basel III Perpetual (Tier I or AT1) bonds have been downgraded thrice by ICRA in a span of 9 months.
a) Nov 24, 2018 - downgraded to AA- from AA.
b) May 03, 2019 - downgraded to A from AA-.
c) July 24, 2019 - downgraded to BBB from A.
3/9
a) Nov 24, 2018 - downgraded to AA- from AA.
b) May 03, 2019 - downgraded to A from AA-.
c) July 24, 2019 - downgraded to BBB from A.
3/9
I am revisiting the topic of Public Issue of Non-Convertible Debentures (NCDs) covered a couple of days back. Only this time, I am focusing on Subordinated (Tier II) NCDs that are slipped in (sometimes slyly) along with senior secured NCDs of NBFCs. Thread (1/9)
Refer to the picture, below (the pic is representative only). A subordinated NCD (circled in red) appears as one of the many maturity options. A naive investor may think that it is similar to other NCDs on offer, just that it has a longer maturity. (2/9)
What many investors are unaware of is the fact that subordinated NCDs are paid after senior NCD holders in-case the company goes into liquidation i.e. subscribers to option I to VIII NCDs, in the pic above, would be paid before payments are made to option IX to XI NCDs. (3/9)
Here is a list of lemons (troubled assets) held by debt schemes of various Mutual Funds -
Qualification - at least 3 lemons post Aug 2018
1. BoI AXA - 6
a) Sintex
b) DHFL
c) Kwality
d) ILFS
e) Coffee Day
f) Avantha Holdings
Thread (1/10)
Qualification - at least 3 lemons post Aug 2018
1. BoI AXA - 6
a) Sintex
b) DHFL
c) Kwality
d) ILFS
e) Coffee Day
f) Avantha Holdings
Thread (1/10)
2. Reliance Nippon - 6
a) ZEE LAS
b) DHFL
c) Morgan Credit (Yes Bank promoter)
d) Reliance Commercial Finance (ADAG)
e) Reliance Home Finance (ADAG)
f) Avantha Realty
(2/10)
a) ZEE LAS
b) DHFL
c) Morgan Credit (Yes Bank promoter)
d) Reliance Commercial Finance (ADAG)
e) Reliance Home Finance (ADAG)
f) Avantha Realty
(2/10)
3. Birla Sunlife - 5
a) ZEE LAS
b) Wadhawan Global (DHFL Promoter)
c) ILFS Tamil Nadu Power
d) Jharkhand Road Project (ILFS)
e) ILFS Education
(3/10)
a) ZEE LAS
b) Wadhawan Global (DHFL Promoter)
c) ILFS Tamil Nadu Power
d) Jharkhand Road Project (ILFS)
e) ILFS Education
(3/10)
Day 2 on Twitter. Coming to the next set of awards - The "Foot in Mouth" Awards. A clear winner in this category is DSP Mutual Fund. I have shortlisted them for their sheer cockiness. Thread. (1/10)
In September, 2018, the Fund House triggered a panic by selling DHFL bonds at distressed levels. It was a business call; and hence a benefit of doubt could be given. (2/10)
What cannot be forgiven though, is the brazenness with which the Fund house eulogised their portfolio selection capabilities. 3/10
Alright! Here I am, making my debut on Twitter. To mark the occasion, I am handing out the "Lemon of the Year" Award to one of the worst performing Debt Mutual Funds.
A clear winner in this category, by a mile, is BoI AXA Credit Risk Fund. Thread (1/9)
A clear winner in this category, by a mile, is BoI AXA Credit Risk Fund. Thread (1/9)
The fund has achieved a rare feat of burning almost 90% of its AUM within a span of last 11 months i.e. the AUM contracted from ~1700 Cr in Aug 2018 to ~200 Cr in Jul 2019.
The one year return is a whopping minus 48%. 2/9
The one year return is a whopping minus 48%. 2/9
The Fund Managers successfully caught all the lemons that fate threw at them viz DHFL, IL&FS, Kwality, Sintex, Cox & Kings, Coffee Day etc. 3/9
