Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #loader
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#apt37 #goldbackdoor #loader active #C2
- SHA256: bd4ef6fae7f29def8e5894bf05057653248f009422de85c1e425d04a0b2df258
- C2: hxxps://dallynk.com/wp-sup3
- Encoded Child SHA256: a81b38cda1ad1a1ed2cfc9647e678831fe77500da8ce095667ca5a7d93f8e732
- SHA256: bd4ef6fae7f29def8e5894bf05057653248f009422de85c1e425d04a0b2df258
- C2: hxxps://dallynk.com/wp-sup3
- Encoded Child SHA256: a81b38cda1ad1a1ed2cfc9647e678831fe77500da8ce095667ca5a7d93f8e732
- Child Endpoints (possibly google api key): hxxps://dallynk.com/4332.hwp, hxxp://asplinc.com/xe/modules/page/queries/query_read.dsql, hxxp://www.bsef.or.kr/board/upfile/bbsB/166737125620120323174332.hwp
- Endpoints appear to be compromised.
- Endpoints appear to be compromised.
- All 3 endpoints download same SHA256: 5b1536c4ca22bc202543afea51279c78fa6033b393e86f2b97750ddfd4d8b263
- Decoded Child contains embedded 3 encoded (simple xor) modules, #shellcode loader/#infostealer/#keylogger
- Decoded Child contains embedded 3 encoded (simple xor) modules, #shellcode loader/#infostealer/#keylogger
#ESETresearch has discovered a unique and undescribed #loader for Windows binaries that, unlike other such loaders, runs as a server and executes received modules in memory. We have named this new malware #Wslink after one of its DLLs. 1/7 @HrckaVladislav welivesecurity.com/2021/10/27/wsl…
The initial compromise vector is not known, and we have seen only a few hits in our telemetry in the past two years, with detections in Central Europe, North America, and the Middle East. 2/7
There are no similarities that suggest this is likely to be a tool from a known threat actor group. Wslink runs as a service and listens on all network interfaces on the port specified in the ServicePort registry value of the service’s Parameters key. 3/7 
