Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #Gerasimov
Most recents (24)
Judging from various reports, the #ukrainecounteroffensive seems to be a complete disaster, even though this is officially denied by the Western side.
But this analysis by Col. Richard Kemp of the #British military shows no expectations of success.
(1/)
news.yahoo.com/prepare-ukrain…
But this analysis by Col. Richard Kemp of the #British military shows no expectations of success.
(1/)
news.yahoo.com/prepare-ukrain…
Col. Kemp uses cautious language, but it is easy to read between the lines. Being a retired Western Colonel, you don't expect him to come out and say openly that #Ukraine️ is going to lose. But that is exactly what he is saying.
Let me explain why the conclusion is clear.
(2/)
Let me explain why the conclusion is clear.
(2/)
His main points:
1. Surprise is essential for success.
But of course, there is no surprise here. The whole world has been expecting this operation for months. There are no unexpected lines of attack like #Incheon in the #KoreanWar in 1950.
(3/)
1. Surprise is essential for success.
But of course, there is no surprise here. The whole world has been expecting this operation for months. There are no unexpected lines of attack like #Incheon in the #KoreanWar in 1950.
(3/)
1. Monday, Ukraine made steady progress on the #southernfront south of #VelykaNovosilka. Earlier gains are being consolidated across a wide front as Russian forces continue to fall back under risk of encirclement. Russia destroyed another dam on the Mokri Yaly river to slow the 
2. Ukrainian force advance but there is no evidence that the Ukrainian offensive will be stalled.
In areas to the south, Ukraine is conducting strikes on Russian command and operational centers striking the operational command center for the entire region in #Henichesk.
In areas to the south, Ukraine is conducting strikes on Russian command and operational centers striking the operational command center for the entire region in #Henichesk.
3. Other strikes are reported in #Melitopol, #Tokmak and #Molochne. One of these strikes has reportedly killed the commander of the Russian 35th Army, Major General #Goryachev.
In the past week, Ukrainian armed forces have come under a spotlight as analysts pore over reports to divine how the 2023 offensive is progressing. It is much too early for such strategic judgements. It is however timely to review the Russian response. 1/25 🧵
2/ Having culminated in their 2023 offensive, the Russians must now (largely) turn to the strategic defensive to defend against the Ukrainian campaign just commenced. What are the next moves for the overall Russian commander, General Valery Gerasimov?
3/ In an article published in May 2023, I characterised Gerasimov as a four-time loser. This is important context in considering his response to the developing Ukrainian 2023 offensive. A brief exploration of his recent failures are as follows. abc.net.au/news/2023-05-0…
Ein kleiner #Ausblick darauf, wie es in den nächsten 2-3 Wochen im Ukraine 🇺🇦 Krieg weiter gehen KÖNNTE:
1. Ein Blick auf die Wetter Modelle zeigen, nachdem es jetzt fast 20 Tage trocken war, dass es im Osten und Süden der Ukraine 🇺🇦 jetzt zu einer Regen-Phase kommt. Das
🧵/1
1. Ein Blick auf die Wetter Modelle zeigen, nachdem es jetzt fast 20 Tage trocken war, dass es im Osten und Süden der Ukraine 🇺🇦 jetzt zu einer Regen-Phase kommt. Das
🧵/1
wird wahrscheinlich den Boden wieder in Schlamm verwandeln, und sehr schwer für eine größere Offensive der AFU 🇺🇦 machen, daher erwarte ich, dass die AFU 🇺🇦 sich weiter vorbereitet, und mit Artillerie weiter Ziele der RF 🇷🇺 angreift. GMLRS / GLSDB / Stormshadow Missiles etc.
/2
/2
Was is bei #Bakhmut zu erwarten?
Da die AFU 🇺🇦 jetzt die Stadt verlassen hat, und sich auf erhöhte, monatelang gebaute Verteidigungslinien zurück gezogen hat, können sie „Feuer frei“ mit Artillerie auf die Stadt geben. Hinzu kommt, dass die Ankündigung von #Prigozhin heute,
/3
Da die AFU 🇺🇦 jetzt die Stadt verlassen hat, und sich auf erhöhte, monatelang gebaute Verteidigungslinien zurück gezogen hat, können sie „Feuer frei“ mit Artillerie auf die Stadt geben. Hinzu kommt, dass die Ankündigung von #Prigozhin heute,
/3
In warfare, an important target is often the enemy commander and the headquarters that assists them to plan and execute military operations. A thread on #Gerasimov, failure and the coming Ukrainian offensives. 1/25 🧵
2/ Killing a senior military leader can result in slower planning and decision making. This can lead to a break down in the cohesion of a large military force, allowing friendly forces to attack them or exploit tactical opportunities while they can’t respond effectively.
3/ The Chinese call this Systems Destruction Warfare. It is an extraordinarily effective approach if planned and coordinated well, particularly given the reliance on communications, sensors and AI-based decision support tools by modern militaries.
#Gerasimov's apparent need to negotiate with subordinate commanders and those commanders’ ability to force his hand suggests that chain of command problems are significantly impacting the Russian military’s ability to conduct coherent theater-wide operations.
2/ ISW has assessed that the RU military command had likely recently decided to reprioritize efforts & resource allocation to prepare to receive potential UKR counteroffensive operations but did not set conditions to appease Prigozhin/offset Wagner’s likely degradation in Bakhmut
3/ The subsequent upheaval over the de-prioritization of Bakhmut and the Russian military command's reversal on supplying Wagner is likely to undermine this theater-wide effort.
#Wagner's #Prigozhin & Chechen leader #Kadyrov may have compelled #Russia's theater commander in #Ukraine Gen #Gerasimov to resume artillery ammunition distribution to Wagner forces in #Bakhmut despite the latter's desired de-prioritization of that effort. isw.pub/UkrWar050723
2/ Prigozhin announced on May 7 that he had obtained a document from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that promised to supply Wagner forces with the ammunition and weapons necessary to maintain offensive operations in Bakhmut.
3/ Prigozhin has not published the official document and ISW cannot verify Prigozhin’s claims at this time. The Russian MoD likely has not fundamentally changed its intention of deprioritizing offensive operations & conserving munitions across the theater, a we recently assessed.
#Wagner’s ongoing persistence within #Bakhmut is incompatible with the overall slow-down in the pace of RU offensive operations elsewhere in #Ukraine as conventional RU forces appear to be largely shifting focus to prepare to receive a much-anticipated UKR counteroffensive. (1/5)
2/ Aside from very limited and localized attacks in the #Kreminna area and near #Donetsk City, Russian forces have largely ceased offensive operations throughout the theater, likely signifying a transition to the defensive.
3/ It would be an operationally sound decision for the Russian MoD to begin withholding and stockpiling ammunition and supplies in order to prepare for any Ukrainian counteroffensive actions, and #Prigozhin’s desperate statements indicate that the Russian MoD is likely doing so.
NEW: The Russian Ministry of Defense appears to have deprioritized the #Bakhmut offensive in favor of preparing to defend against an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive, putting #WagnerGroup & its financier #Prigozhin in a potentially difficult position isw.pub/UkrWar050523
2/ #Prigozhin released a series of videos on May 4 and 5 announcing that #Wagner will withdraw from #Bakhmut on May 10 unless Wagner receives the necessary supplies...
3/ ...and launched particularly acerbic and emotional attacks against Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery #Gerasimov, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei #Shoigu, and the Russian MoD establishment writ large.
New: Russian, Ukrainian, and Western sources observed that the Russian winter offensive has failed to achieve the Kremlin’s goals of seizing all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by March 31.
Our latest: isw.pub/UkrWar040123
Our latest: isw.pub/UkrWar040123
Chief of the #Russian General Staff Valery #Gerasimov had announced on December 22 that Russian forces were focusing most of their efforts on seizing #Donetsk Oblast. 2/
1. Putin acts like a mob boss using violence to obtain compliance. I think he attacked today because he knows his forces are vulnerable around #Bakhmut. For days I've seen the battlefield being shaped in #Ukraine's favor. And this is pretty much what I thought could happen.
2. That's a notional scenario of how most of #Wagner forces are way over extended and could be encircled. This was done by source I've found consistently accurate in both battle status and predictions. This is what I've been pondering.
3. This is a map I rely on for accurate force deployments. The balance of forces in Bakhmut strongly weighs in Ukraine's favor. It's muddy season. But those red lines I drew are paved roads that a combined arms operation of main battle tanks, Bradleys and infantry,
#Russian Defense Minister Sergei #Shoigu met with Eastern Military District Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov in western #Donetsk Oblast, likely to assess the extent of Russian losses around #Vuhledar & the possibility of a further offensive there.🧵isw.pub/UkrWar03042023
1/n
Remember #Prigozhin annoyance? On inadequate ammo deliveries?
Here some angry assessments from 🇷🇺: (based on data from 🇷🇺 MoD for 18-20 Feb)
- delivered: 1660 projectiles for MLRS, 10171 for guns/mortars, 980 for tanks.
Remember #Prigozhin annoyance? On inadequate ammo deliveries?
Here some angry assessments from 🇷🇺: (based on data from 🇷🇺 MoD for 18-20 Feb)
- delivered: 1660 projectiles for MLRS, 10171 for guns/mortars, 980 for tanks.
2/n
- (🇷🇺): this is only for 2-5 days, 980 is only for 26 tanks, 1660 is only for 42 BM-21. One mortar needs 100 bombs per day
- 🇷🇺 MoD declared to meet all Feb 2023 ammo requirements from #WagnerGroup by the end of the month! (so at least some were not met)
- (🇷🇺): this is only for 2-5 days, 980 is only for 26 tanks, 1660 is only for 42 BM-21. One mortar needs 100 bombs per day
- 🇷🇺 MoD declared to meet all Feb 2023 ammo requirements from #WagnerGroup by the end of the month! (so at least some were not met)
3/n
- #WagnerGroup itself estimate it regularly is not delivered 80% of requested ammo and these are delayed for 20 days.
The conflict between 🇷🇺 MoD (#Shoygu / #Gerasimov) and #Prigozhin continues
cc @HN_Schlottman @Maciej_Korowaj @STRATPOINTS_EU @NATOJFCBS
- #WagnerGroup itself estimate it regularly is not delivered 80% of requested ammo and these are delayed for 20 days.
The conflict between 🇷🇺 MoD (#Shoygu / #Gerasimov) and #Prigozhin continues
cc @HN_Schlottman @Maciej_Korowaj @STRATPOINTS_EU @NATOJFCBS
🇷🇺🔥🇺🇦 #Rusia Vs #Ucrania - Día 363 - Iniciamos #hilo sobre la #GuerraEnUcrania.
🟥 En el siguiente vídeo se puede ver cómo un cuadricóptero ucraniano alcanza un carro de combate T-80BV ruso (seguramente ya fuera de servicio) con una granada de 40mm.
🟥 #RETWEEETMEPLEASE 🙏
🟥 En el siguiente vídeo se puede ver cómo un cuadricóptero ucraniano alcanza un carro de combate T-80BV ruso (seguramente ya fuera de servicio) con una granada de 40mm.
🟥 #RETWEEETMEPLEASE 🙏
🇷🇺🔥🇺🇦 #Rusia Vs #Ucrania - Día 363 - Este es, para quien no lo haya leído, nuestro informe diario sobre la #GuerraEnUcrania correspondiente a la jornada de ayer, lunes 20 de febrero de 2023 ⬇️
revistaejercitos.com/2023/02/20/gue…
revistaejercitos.com/2023/02/20/gue…
🇷🇺🔥🇺🇦 #Rusia Vs #Ucrania - Día 362 - En unos minutos empezará el esperado acto en el que #Putin ofrecerá si discurso sobre el estado de la Nación. Como dice @mrsahuquillo se espera que sea más beligerante ⬇️
#Girkin glaubt, dass Russland 🇷🇺 mit der derzeitigen Führung keine Chance hat, den Krieg in der Ukraine 🇺🇦 zu gewinnen.
„Wir (🇷🇺) haben es zuerst gewonnen und hatten gute Chancen, es zu gewinnen, aber jetzt verlieren wir & ziehen uns zurück“ — Girkin.
„Wir (🇷🇺) haben es zuerst gewonnen und hatten gute Chancen, es zu gewinnen, aber jetzt verlieren wir & ziehen uns zurück“ — Girkin.
🇷🇺Kommandeur des Wostok-Bataillons #Khodakovsky, der in der Nähe von Vuhledar angriff, riet RF, aufzuhören: „Ich habe gesagt & bin weiterhin der Meinung, dass es jetzt besser ist, von der Verteidigung in den gehaltenen Linien aus zu agieren, das Potenzial für Offensive zu sammeln
#Tatarsky, ein 🇷🇺 Kreml-Kriegsberichterstatter, kritisierte auch den Verlauf der 🇷🇺 Offensive: „Unser Vormarsch reicht nicht für den Sieg – es ist keine Besetzung einiger Hügel. Siege werden erzielt, indem man die 🇺🇦Front durchbricht …das passiert nicht‼️
1/n
#GuerreEnUkraine D+347 (05/02) PdS1 - Théâtre du #Donbass
"#Bakhmut est de plus en plus isolée" (@DefenceHQ)👇
"C'est très difficile désormais à #Bakhmut, #Vuhledar, #Lyman" (@ZelenskyyUa)
#GuerreEnUkraine D+347 (05/02) PdS1 - Théâtre du #Donbass
"#Bakhmut est de plus en plus isolée" (@DefenceHQ)👇
"C'est très difficile désormais à #Bakhmut, #Vuhledar, #Lyman" (@ZelenskyyUa)
2/n
Il faut se méfier des apparences :
-l'armée russe a des capacités offensives limitées, locales
-l'armée ukrainienne replie dans l'ordre en maximisant les pertes ennemies
-#Zaluzhny peut avoir décidé depuis la mobilisation russe d'attendre que #gerasimov bouge en premier
Il faut se méfier des apparences :
-l'armée russe a des capacités offensives limitées, locales
-l'armée ukrainienne replie dans l'ordre en maximisant les pertes ennemies
-#Zaluzhny peut avoir décidé depuis la mobilisation russe d'attendre que #gerasimov bouge en premier
3/n
1/#Svatove
Aucun changement de la ligne de front👇 visuellement confirmé malgré les nombreuses reconnaissances en force russes dans l'axe de #Stelmakhivka à l'est de #Svatove et dans celui de #Dibrova au nord
1/#Svatove
Aucun changement de la ligne de front👇 visuellement confirmé malgré les nombreuses reconnaissances en force russes dans l'axe de #Stelmakhivka à l'est de #Svatove et dans celui de #Dibrova au nord
Dear subscribers and guests of the channel!
Yesterday, #Russian president Vladimir #Putin held two meetings via video call. The first one was with representatives of the leadership of the security bloc. The second one was with the leadership of the military bloc.
1/11
Yesterday, #Russian president Vladimir #Putin held two meetings via video call. The first one was with representatives of the leadership of the security bloc. The second one was with the leadership of the military bloc.
1/11
At the meeting with representatives of the security bloc, they discussed the state of affairs in the country as a whole and in the "new territories" in particular. The question was raised about the movement of refugee flows from new territories to #Russia...
2/11
2/11
Here is the new and third thread 🧵 for the Strategic Assessment of Russo-Ukrainian War that started after the fell of Soledar and defense of Bakhmut. This is the fourth thread on overall strategic assessment of war. #Svatove #Kreminna #Vuhledar #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar
1) Please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
1/n
Alle 21 di Londra, le 20 italiane, la BBC manderà in onda "#Putin Vs the West", documentario straordinario dedicato a Vladimir Putin e alle sue relazioni con il leader internazionali. Ma un'anticipazione dedicata alla telefonata intercorsa fra il leader del Cremlino e Boris
Alle 21 di Londra, le 20 italiane, la BBC manderà in onda "#Putin Vs the West", documentario straordinario dedicato a Vladimir Putin e alle sue relazioni con il leader internazionali. Ma un'anticipazione dedicata alla telefonata intercorsa fra il leader del Cremlino e Boris
2/n
Johnson sta già facendo discutere.
I fatti: l'ex primo ministro del Regno Unito ha dichiarato di aver ricevuto - prima dell'invasione - una minaccia da parte del presidente russo.
Essa ha avuto luogo in quella che viene descritta come una "lunghissima" telefonata nel
Johnson sta già facendo discutere.
I fatti: l'ex primo ministro del Regno Unito ha dichiarato di aver ricevuto - prima dell'invasione - una minaccia da parte del presidente russo.
Essa ha avuto luogo in quella che viene descritta come una "lunghissima" telefonata nel
3/n
febbraio 2022.
In risposta all'avviso di Johnson, secondo cui la guerra sarebbe stata per la #Russia una "catastrofe totale", Vladimir Putin rispose che "gli sarebbe bastato un minuto".
Come contestualizzare questa frase? Johnson ha ricostruito il colloquio, sostenendo di
febbraio 2022.
In risposta all'avviso di Johnson, secondo cui la guerra sarebbe stata per la #Russia una "catastrofe totale", Vladimir Putin rispose che "gli sarebbe bastato un minuto".
Come contestualizzare questa frase? Johnson ha ricostruito il colloquio, sostenendo di
Dear subscribers and guests of the channel! Valery #Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the #Russian Federation, for some reason, decided that he was in charge of the "special military operation".
1/4
1/4
He turned to #Putin a few days ago with a proposal to refrain from massive missile strikes on #Ukraine's critical infrastructure "for a while". The President promised to think.
2/4
2/4
Today's missile attack on #Ukraine is not only a response to #Gerasimov but also a symbolic rejection of the "peace initiatives" passed to #Putin through intermediaries a few days ago, as we reported.
3/4
3/4
One of the best ways to defeat an adversary is to target their #strategy. To do that, we must understand it. Therefore, in my latest article, I explore Russian strategy, and its various components, for its continuing #Ukraine invasion in 2023. 1/25 🧵🇺🇦 mickryan.substack.com/p/thinking-abo…
2/ The plan for a ten-day lightening conquest of Ukraine, as described in a recent RUSI report, was – in the main – a failure. The Russians did make considerable gains in the south and the east, but their northern campaign was a military disaster. rusi.org/explore-our-re…
3/ Despite battlefield setbacks in the north and northeast of Ukraine, Putin and his defence and intelligence chiefs proceeded to assemble an alternative theory of victory for their invasion and attempted takeover of #Ukraine.
Dear subscribers and guests of the channel! Contrary to the words of the press secretary of the President of #Russia, Dmitry Peskov, yesterday, Russian President Vladimir #Putin traditionally did NOT swim in the ice hole in the Epiphany and did NOT even plunge into it.
1/16
1/16
In recent years, the President has been trying to stay away from the ice holes. He takes baths with a stable water temperature of 36.6°C. In past years, the double played the role of #Putin, who took baths in ice water.
2/16
2/16
But, in November, the double had an exacerbation of chronic kidney disease, and doctors did not recommend exposing him to extreme stress yet. Besides, now, #Putin simply needs a double. Given the poor health of the President, the double holds more than...
3/16
3/16
Dear subscribers and guests of the channel! Yesterday, #Russian President Vladimir #Putin, during a meeting via video call with representatives of the leadership of the military bloc, expressed claims about the uncertainty with the capture of #Soledar.
1/10
1/10
The military reported that it could take from several days to several weeks to establish complete control over #Soledar. The military command recommended #Putin ignore #Prigozhin's assurances about the exclusive role of PMCs in the operation to take this settlement.
2/10
2/10
The military described #Prigozhin as a "f..zdun" and focused the President's attention on the disproportionately high expenditure of resources by PMCs to achieve dubious results. #Putin said that he would deal with this issue.
3/10
3/10
Earlier this week, I published a thread that was the first of two parts examining how #Ukraine and Russia might think about – and plan – the inevitable offensives to come in 2023. The #Gerasimov appointment pushed this second part back a couple of days! 1/25 🧵
2/ In Part 1, I proposed seven considerations for those planning these offensives: purpose; design; timing; location; resources; adaptation; & politics. I then examined the first 4 in detail. Today, I explore the final 3 considerations.
(Part 1👇)
(Part 1👇)
3/ Resources. Offensive operations are hugely expensive in recon assets (to find, fix and kill the enemy), artillery, armour and mobility support (engineers), logistics and air support. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades, Divisions or Corps, will be needed.
