Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #CFIUS
Most recents (10)
As #TikTok's CEO is being grilled by the US House Committee on Energy and Commerce, it's time to cut through the noise on what the issues are with TikTok and why the USG, through #CFIUS, seems trending toward a force divestiture.
First, I cannot disclose anything about this transaction that I learned while working on CFIUS matters in the USG. Everything on this thread is based on information that is publicly available through news reporting.
The issues with Tiktok is two-fold – data security and the ability to manipulate the algorithm for propaganda. I wrote an explainer about this in the Washington Post back in 2020: washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/…
Elon Musk's decision to slash 75% of Twitter employees will eviscerate Twitter's already anemic trust and safety department. It will embolden hate speech, threats to marginalized groups and proliferate misinformation —ultimately it will crater the company.
washingtonpost.com/technology/202…
washingtonpost.com/technology/202…
Dozens of organizations have joined @accountabletech in calling on congress to investigate the national security implications of Elon Musk's acquisition of twitter. You can join the petition to congress here: stopthedeal.com/congress-inves…
@accountabletech This is still a developing story but this oped from @nicolelgill at @accountabletech lays out the importance of a congressional investigation and robust CFIUS review needed to shed light on just how much foreign funding Elon is using to make this purchase.
The Biden admin and #TikTok have drafted a preliminary agreement to resolve national security concerns but face hurdles over the terms, as the platform negotiates to keep operating in the United States without major changes to its ownership structure.
nytimes.com/2022/09/26/tec…
nytimes.com/2022/09/26/tec…
I've written previously about what the threats of #TikTok are to democratic societies for @SecureDemocracy.
There are two main ones:
1⃣ Data exfiltration
2⃣ Information manipulation
So far, policy efforts such as via #CFIUS have focused chiefly on 1⃣ .
securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/qa-with-lindsa…
There are two main ones:
1⃣ Data exfiltration
2⃣ Information manipulation
So far, policy efforts such as via #CFIUS have focused chiefly on 1⃣ .
securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/qa-with-lindsa…
And for @lawfareblog on what the US and its democratic partners -- many of whom like Australia🇦🇺 have raised and continue to raise similar concerns -- should be doing.
lawfareblog.com/way-forward-us…
lawfareblog.com/way-forward-us…
1/4–YES—In Senate Intelligence Hearing,Should U.S. Outbound Investment to China be Monitored? prosperousamerica.org/senate-intelli…—“1 of the biggest,if not surprising,takeaways from Wednesday’s Senate Intelligence Committee hearing came from Sen. Bob Casey (D-PA). While everyone in the room..
2/4–was focused on adversaries spying on the private sector,& influence operations in academia & elsewhere, Senator Casey asked the 4 panelists—shouldn’t the U.S. gov’t be monitoring what American multinationals r investing in overseas?
“Could the National Counterintelligence &..
“Could the National Counterintelligence &..
3/4–Security Center(NCSC)or the intelligence community more broadly help educate the private sector 2 the risk of outbound investment,especially when it comes 2 China,”Sen. Casey asked—adding that an assessment of U.S. capital investments into early-stage technology development..
On Thursday, US @SFRCdems will vote on a "Strategic Competition Act" with China.
On #geoeconomic front, it aims to pull together some FP, #connectivity practices into one China-centric strategy and also proposes concrete policy measures.
Some highlights [long thread]
/1
On #geoeconomic front, it aims to pull together some FP, #connectivity practices into one China-centric strategy and also proposes concrete policy measures.
Some highlights [long thread]
/1
101: $15mil/year for US embassies to hire expert who helps interested businesses with supply chain diversification/management away from China
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113: Global infrastructure needs closer monitoring, gov involvement. The Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (GICC) pushed as an important coordination tool
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The former Chinese PLA general who has acquired 200 sq miles of Texas land has significantly expanded the existing runway at their operations Ctr in order to land large commercial airliners.He flys in with multiple Chinese guests (sometimes Jack Ma) each month. #China #Texas
It’s starting to resemble the island runways in the South China Sea. It’s hard to believe this infiltration of the Texas power grid and US Air Force training space can happen today given China’s position as a “strategic competitor” at best and a full-fledged “Enemy” at worst.
CFIUS must move to cancel the purchases of these strategically important lands in South Texas. #CFIUS #Pompeo @SecPompeo @JohnCornyn @SenTedCruz
By popular demand (thanks @goodhouses) a thread on #natsecurity review of #FDI, #CFIUS, its expansion under Trump, and what we are likely to see from CFIUS during the #Biden administration:
CFIUS is the U.S. interagency committee that reviews acquisitions (and now certain investments that fall below this threshold) of U.S. businesses for potential national security risks. The process is mostly voluntary & provides legal safe harbor to cleared transactions.
CFIUS can only intervene in a transaction if the committee (Treasury, State, DoD, DHS, DOE, Commerce, USTR, Science & Tech Policy, DOJ) determines there is a natsec risk arising from the transaction. Natsec is not defined in statute, but see here: home.treasury.gov/system/files/2…
Hey #CFIUS twitter. DOD FY2021 CFIUS budget is out!
comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Doc…
@ChorzempaMartin @geoffreygertz @JJCarafano @SchoffJ @MPGoodman88
comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Doc…
@ChorzempaMartin @geoffreygertz @JJCarafano @SchoffJ @MPGoodman88
Takeaways:
FY2021 budget request is an increase from FY2020 by $2.5 billion to $26.8 billion.
It was just a few years ago (FY2017) DOD's CFIUS budget was $11.9 billion.
FY2021 budget request is an increase from FY2020 by $2.5 billion to $26.8 billion.
It was just a few years ago (FY2017) DOD's CFIUS budget was $11.9 billion.
DOD is projecting CFIUS cases filed =
233 in FY2019
1200 in FY2020
1400 in FY2021
Cases that are managed =
175 in FY2020
220 in FY2021
Also projecting quantity of non-notified transactions that are being monitored, 150 in FY2020, 150 in FY2021
233 in FY2019
1200 in FY2020
1400 in FY2021
Cases that are managed =
175 in FY2020
220 in FY2021
Also projecting quantity of non-notified transactions that are being monitored, 150 in FY2020, 150 in FY2021
#CFIUS GUIDANCE: @USTreasury recently updated their FAQs on the FIRRMA pilot program. @nvca has asked for additional guidance since the pilot went into effect in November and there has been very limited clarity. Read on to hear what Treasury said (1/12) tinyurl.com/yccp4ne7
Most interesting FAQ is #22 which pertains to how the pilot rules deal with a foreign person that does a indirect investment via a fund but ALSO a direct investment into a US company. This is something NVCA asked about in our Nov. filing. (2/12) tinyurl.com/yytuwpgk
We asked: "If a foreign limited partner in a fund makes a direct investment in one of the fund's portfolio companies, without coordination from the fund, will that direct investment be treated in isolation from the fund's investment?" (3/12)
How did NK get/develop ICBMs so dang quick!?!? #U1P #SwampCreatures #luciferians #CFIUS #johnpodesta #JohnKerry #TonyPodesta #HillaryClinton #BarackObama #NorthKorea @USNJack @Imperator_Rex3 @damartin32 @POTUS @realDonaldTrump @PressSec #RobertMueller @seanhannity @TuckerCarlson
@USNJack @Imperator_Rex3 @damartin32 @POTUS @realDonaldTrump @PressSec @seanhannity @TuckerCarlson Obviously this is theory.
So far I've found that Iran's 90% enriched U (enough for 3 warheads) and 3 tons of 3.6% enriched U were shipped "out of country" the day of the Iran deal, and $1B US cash was flown into Iran. I'll thred the story when i have more answers.
So far I've found that Iran's 90% enriched U (enough for 3 warheads) and 3 tons of 3.6% enriched U were shipped "out of country" the day of the Iran deal, and $1B US cash was flown into Iran. I'll thred the story when i have more answers.
@USNJack @Imperator_Rex3 @damartin32 @POTUS @realDonaldTrump @PressSec @seanhannity @TuckerCarlson Here's the breakdown of the Iran deal w/sauce:
