Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #APSA2022
Most recents (21)
A finding I saw at #APSA2022 that I can’t stop thinking about: in a paper on congress. primaries. @kbawn @stp_polisci and Zaller show that local newspapers often do not provide any info for voters to choose a preferred candidate. 1/
For example, 25 percent of all papers provide zero stories with substantive information to help voters differentiate the candidates. That falls to 14 percent for the runoff (so better, but still bad). (The authors break this down by kinds of relevant information, etc.) 2/
Why am I thinking about this? One proposal for better primaries is instant-runoff w/ RCV. This finding suggests (a) voters don’t have enough information to make any choices, let alone rank them all and (b) a non-instant runoff improves this a meaningfully. 3/3
Hi new followers! Since u followed me after #APSA2022 where @kath_stoner, @darelasn, Olena Nikolayenko & I disputed Mearsheimer’s claim that NATO expansion made Putin 2 attack 🇺🇦, I put together🧵summarizing my comments. Thx @PopovaProf & @dandrezner 4 live-tweeting panel! 1/21
My broader argument was that accurate analysis of the war needs to take seriously 2 things not taken seriously by great power politics realist analysis: 1) dynamics of domestic politics in 🇷🇺 & 🇺🇦, especially identity politics, and b) Ukrainian agency. 2/21
JM claim that NATO expansion provoked🇷🇺 2 invade 🇺🇦 & that Putin has no intent 2 destroy 🇺🇦 sovereign statehood is wrong. As theoretical approach it denies agency even 2🇷🇺 (it had no choice but 2 lash out, while NATO did), while 🇺🇦 is but a pawn of great powers. Also 3/21
At #APSA2022, Tsveta Petrova asks: Do political scandals mobilize populist voters because it gives proof of "corrupt elites"? And what happens if it is the populist elites that are the focus of the scandal? 1/5
The dataset are data on political scandals in Hungary and Poland from 2000 to 2020. This includes scandals related to legality, morality and democratic violations. This is connected to data on electoral support (i.e., vote shares). 2/5
The data shows that populist elites are heavily involved in scandals when they come to power. But having populist in power also increases scandals among the opposition, in part, because the populists use official media to target the opposition. 3/5
Populists in power undermine democratic institutions but are these actions aligned with the preferences of their voters?, asks Tsveta Petrova at #APSA2022 1/5
In general, some prior research suggests that populist supports are loyal to pluralist democracy. Other research suggests that populist supporters do not, in fact, support democracy. 2/5
A third possibility is that populist voters support a particular form of democracy: majoritarian democracy, where decisions reflect the "will of the people". 3/5
At #APSA2022, Natasha Wunsch asks why voters tolerate democratic backsliding, focusing on the Hungarian case. 1/9
The puzzle is why citizens who state they support democracy still support undemocratic leaders? There is a growing literature on partisanship and how group psychology produce acceptance of inparty candidates, even if they are undemocratic. 2/9
But these findings are not entirely reproducible. Instead, it may be that there is heterogeniety among supporters of authoritarian politics. The party essentially builds a large voter coalition and this enables them to stay in power. 3/9
Having monitored Russia's war narratives since the invasion began, one thing is puzzling: some narratives quickly faded from broadcast media, yet remain in active circulation. How?
A short 🧵on the double lives of Russia's war narratives (aka my #APSA2022 paper) 1/9
A short 🧵on the double lives of Russia's war narratives (aka my #APSA2022 paper) 1/9
(For background on previous findings from both federal and regional broadcast media, you can check out this earlier thread):
2/9
2/9
Looking at federal TV, we see a familiar tangle of war narratives. There's just one narrative that rises about all others: Ukrainian nationalists as Russia's enemy. Justifications for the war faded esp. after Mariupol. Schemes against Russia are reduced to sanctions.
3/9
3/9
At #APSA2022, @EricGroenendyk asks how perceptions of politics as conflict shape other political attitudes.
While many often see politics as conflict over resources, it may also be conceptualized as joint problem-solving. Does perceptions of this matter? 1/10
While many often see politics as conflict over resources, it may also be conceptualized as joint problem-solving. Does perceptions of this matter? 1/10
This is part of a larger project. In a published paper, it has already been shown that politics-as-conflict activates motivated reasoning. The present results focus on how politics-as-conflict perceptions shape political engagement. 2/10
Prior research suggests that conflict orientations increases engagement in politics. This raises the question of whether participatory democracy is even compatible with delibrative problem-solving democracy? 3/10
At #APSA2022, @Bryan_Gervais asks whether elite political incivility polarizes the electorate?
There are two camps: One says 'yes' and one says 'no'. The latter camp argues that incivility may in fact depolarize.
But: May the effect depend on the conditions of incivility? 1/6
There are two camps: One says 'yes' and one says 'no'. The latter camp argues that incivility may in fact depolarize.
But: May the effect depend on the conditions of incivility? 1/6
When may in-elite hostility polarize? Perhaps in competitive elections where status threats are clear. Prior research shows that status threats lead to preferences for aggression. But when status threats are not clear, incivility might be rejected by partisans. 2/6
The data comes from four experiments in online surveys. The timing of these surveys differed in their distance to a competitive election. In the surveys, participants are exposed to civil versus incivil political statements from in-party elites. 3/6
At #APSA2022, Brianna Smith examines the so-called "weapons effect", i..e, the idea that being around weapons increases aggression. Specifically, is the weapons effect stronger if potential aggression is directed towards outgroups (Black individuals for white individuals). 1/6
The "weapons effect" seems real and has been demonstrated in meta-analyses as well as across cultures and even just using images rather than real weapons. 2/6
How may race play a role? Research shows that there is hostility among white people towards Black people. Furthermore, racial stereotypes connect Black people with gun violence. So, is the "weapons effect" stronger when white individuals confront Black individuals? 3/6
Mearsheimer just said that the US was bent on integrating Ukraine 🇺🇦 into the West and pursued it through NATO/EU expansion and Ukr democracy promotion. Who knew that Ukraine was more important to the US than to Russia. #APSA2022
According to JM, controlling Ukraine is existential to Russia so much so that they will escalate to nukes rather than lose. But Russia doesn’t want to conquer Ukraine. So why is it existential to control them? No explanation from Mearsheimer.
@OxanaShevel has destroyed every argument JM made it with evidence and with poise!
Damn. @kath_stoner ain’t messing around on this #APSA2022 panel on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Makes it clear at the outset that she thinks Mearsheimer’s arguments about the causes of the war are horses**t.
P.S.: Mearsheimer is also on this panel.
P.S.: Mearsheimer is also on this panel.
Mearsheimer, in his response, claims that Putin’s long July 2021 essay on Ukraine provides zero evidence that Putin wanted/intended to absorb Ukraine into Russia.
The next speaker @darelasn spends the first five minutes of his presentation pointing out the myriad ways that Russia wanted to absorb Ukraine and has wanted to do so for more than a century, falsifying Mearsheimer’s claims.
At #APSA2022, @soerendamsbo examines how experiences of extreme weather influence pro-climate voting.
There is alot of evidence that extreme weather influence pro-climate attitudes but we know little about whether behavioral outcomes are influenced too. 1/8
There is alot of evidence that extreme weather influence pro-climate attitudes but we know little about whether behavioral outcomes are influenced too. 1/8
There is prior evidence that extreme weather doesn't lead to more private environmental behavior but some evidence that it increases attention to weather on the web and social media. 2/8
Does it influence *political* behavior in the form of pro-climate voting?
Some work suggest "yes" and that pro-climate voting increases efter flooding and wildfires. But there also other work suggesting null-effects. More data is needed! 3/8
Some work suggest "yes" and that pro-climate voting increases efter flooding and wildfires. But there also other work suggesting null-effects. More data is needed! 3/8
Do important political attitudes shift in response to extreme weather?, asks @AnthonyCalacino at #APSA2022
Climate change increases extreme weather incidents but we know less about their opinion effects, especially in the Global South. 1/5
Climate change increases extreme weather incidents but we know less about their opinion effects, especially in the Global South. 1/5
Extreme weather may decrease support for democracy, as the disaster is taken as a sign that the system is not working. But individual politicians & organizations that take action may gain increased support. Both effects may imply that extreme weather mobilizes voters. 2/5
The data comes from the 7 wave Latin American Popular Opinion Project for Brazil and Mexico (covering 2006-2019). As a measure of weather, the monthly precipitation index is used, standardized to local historical average. 3/5
During a crisis leaders often encourage unity. At the same time, polarization is increasing - and a crisis can be used to shed further negative light on opponents.
How did these competing incentives shape elite rhetoric during the pandemic?, asks @MJHeseltine at #APSA2022 1/5
How did these competing incentives shape elite rhetoric during the pandemic?, asks @MJHeseltine at #APSA2022 1/5
The data is 20 million tweets from 6 English-speaking countries, using classifiers of polarizing rhetoric in COVID-19-related tweets. 2/5
Analyses show that there was a massive spike in covid tweets in March 2020, in particular in the US and Canada. At the same time, in spring '20, there is a strong decrease in polarization but it increases again after a few months. 3/5
At #APSA2022, @Sacha_Altay asks whether there really was a dramatic "infodemic" during the pandemic? The answer is 'no'.
In fact, people turned towards more trustworthy news sources. 1/6
In fact, people turned towards more trustworthy news sources. 1/6
To quantify the so-called "infodemic", visits to news websites and interactions with news outlets on Facebook was tracked from July '17 to July '21.
News outlets were rated on trustworthiness using NewsGuard, which evaluates news on journalistic norms of credibility. 2/6
News outlets were rated on trustworthiness using NewsGuard, which evaluates news on journalistic norms of credibility. 2/6
So, did people turn to more or less trustworthy news during the pandemic?
In the US, there was a strong turn towards more trustworthy news sites in March '20. This pattern also occurs in UK, France & Germany (i.e., all countries tracked). 3/6
In the US, there was a strong turn towards more trustworthy news sites in March '20. This pattern also occurs in UK, France & Germany (i.e., all countries tracked). 3/6
At #APSA2022, @ProfKenMulligan & Atinuke Ayowole covers the negativity of press coverage during COVID-19.
Research reveals a negativity bias in both human cognition & news media reporting. To what extent is the latter driven by competition-induced sensationalism? 1/4
Research reveals a negativity bias in both human cognition & news media reporting. To what extent is the latter driven by competition-induced sensationalism? 1/4
The data comes from four continents. Here, sentiments of free- and non-free media's coverage of the pandemic are compared (e.g., for Europe, a free media in Finland and a non-free media in Russia). Data comes from the GDELT database. 2/4
The results show that the free-press media at all continents are more negative than the non-free. Differences are particularly pronounced for strong measures related to "distress", "panic" & "hysteria". 3/4
At #APSA2022, Elena Baro asks whether populists supporters have anything in common?
Specifically, there are both populists on the left and the right but do these groups share common traits, also across countries and over time? 1/5
Specifically, there are both populists on the left and the right but do these groups share common traits, also across countries and over time? 1/5
The data source is the European Social Survey 2002-2018, covering 9 West-European countries. Populist parties are defined by PopuList. 2/5
The results show that voters of populist parties generally have less political trust and are less happy with democracy. They are opposed to immigration but supportive of redistribution. Are these associations stable over time and countries? 3/5
Does increased visibility of radical-right parties translate into electoral gains?, asks @alexjabbour at #APSA2022
Visibility can indicate high support, which can generate further support, but could also mobilize people against the RRP.
So, what happens? 1/4
Visibility can indicate high support, which can generate further support, but could also mobilize people against the RRP.
So, what happens? 1/4
Visibility can both be shaped by media attention or election results (e.g., entry into parliament).
Prior research suggests that electoral entry does boost support in next election but this could also reflect more institutional support. 2/4
Prior research suggests that electoral entry does boost support in next election but this could also reflect more institutional support. 2/4
How can we establish causality? This study use qualifications to 2nd election round in France as a case. These qualifications are quasi-random, if we focus on just being below or above the needed threshold. 3/4
At #APSA2022, @boralexander1 presents our research on the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on cross-national support for the political system: psyarxiv.com/qjmct/
🧵 1/8
🧵 1/8
The pandemic was the largest socio-political crisis of our lifetime.
Which negative socio-political effects could this generate? (1) Horizontal relationships could be challenged (i.e., solidarity); (2) vertical relationships could be challenged (i.e., system support). 2/8
Which negative socio-political effects could this generate? (1) Horizontal relationships could be challenged (i.e., solidarity); (2) vertical relationships could be challenged (i.e., system support). 2/8
To study this, we fielded panel surveys in 4 countries in 2020 (April, June & Dec): US, Denmark, Italy & Hungary (i.e., a diverse set of countries). We use measures from pre-pandemic World Values Survey as benchmark. 3/8
At #APSA2022, @lucasb0rba asks whether conspiracy theories undermine support for democracy, using experiments in Brazil.
Many are worried about conspiracy theories but limited knowledge about their effects, especially in Global South. These studies try to remedy this. 1/8
Many are worried about conspiracy theories but limited knowledge about their effects, especially in Global South. These studies try to remedy this. 1/8
In Brazil, there is a high incidence of conspiracy theories. One specific event--the stabbing of Bolsonaro--triggered many. At the same time, Brazil is experiencing democratic backsliding. 2/8
Bolsonaro argued that the left-wing was behind the stabbing. Lula--his opponent-- argued that the stabbing was staged by Bolsonaro himself. 3/8
At #APSA2022, Enders, @JoeUscinski & @klofstad asks: Have conspiracy beliefs increased over time?
Pundits say we live in a "golden age" of conspiracy beliefs. Surveys show that the public agrees: 73% believe that conspiracy theories are "out of control".
But is it true? 1/10
Pundits say we live in a "golden age" of conspiracy beliefs. Surveys show that the public agrees: 73% believe that conspiracy theories are "out of control".
But is it true? 1/10
If true, there are reason for concern.
Conspiracy beliefs correlate with a range of problematic behavior including anti-social personality, non-normative behavior (incl violence) & lack of positive health behavior.
But noone has actually tried to test whether it is true. 2/10
Conspiracy beliefs correlate with a range of problematic behavior including anti-social personality, non-normative behavior (incl violence) & lack of positive health behavior.
But noone has actually tried to test whether it is true. 2/10
The key problem with testing is *data*. We don't have many over-time sources of conspiracy beliefs.
But we have some! 3/10
But we have some! 3/10
